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WESTERN WATER LAW, GLOBAL WARMING,
AND GROWTH LIMITATIONS
A. Dan Tarlock*
"For behold, the Lord, the Lord of Hosts, doth take away
from Jerusalem and from Judah the stay and the staff, the whole
stay of bread, and the whole stay of water. " 1 "I will also com-
mand the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. "2
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE DOOMSAYERS SAY
Both the urban and rural western parts of the United States are ex-
tremely vulnerable to the adverse consequences of global warming Pa-
cific Ocean coastal dwellers face rising sea levels and the loss of littoral
land. Eustarine areas face the risk of destruction from rising sea levels as
the vital fresh-salt water balance will be destroyed. Regional fresh water
supplies may be adversely affected in ways that are difficult to predict.
The head of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, Advanced
Study Program, advises that global warming will not be a simple shift to
a warmer, stable climate.4 Rather, each decade the climate will continue
to change. The new climates will result from a combination of increases
in surface temperatures and annual weather variations.5 Urban concen-
* A. Dan Tarlock, Member, Water Science and Technology Board, National Academy
of Sciences, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This Article is a substantially
revised and expanded version of a paper prepared for the Colloquium on Managing Water
Resources Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty sponsored by the Water Science and
Technology Board of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Novem-
ber 14-16, 1990, in Scottsdale, Arizona. The original paper will be published by the National
Academy Press in 1991.
1. Isaiah 3:1 (emphasis added).
2. Id. at 5:6 (emphasis added).
3. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 4-1 (1988)
(discussing potential impact of global warming on California). Global warming is caused by
the accumulation of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons, also
known as the "greenhouse effect." Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States
Laws Can Do To Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U.L. REv 203, 203-04 (1989). This
causes the sun's rays to become trapped in the Earth's atmoshphere and prevents the excess
heat from escaping. Id. at 204.
4. Firor, The Heating of the Climate, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. POL'Y 29, 38 (1990).
5. Id. See generally W. REID & M. TREXLER, DROWNING THE NATIONAL HERITAGE:
CLIMATE CHANGE AND COASTAL BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
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trations which survive sea level rises will probably face severe water
shortages. All these effects will be exacerbated during the drought cycles
which occur regardless of global warming.
Farmers, fish and wildlife will probably suffer the most from global
warming because there will be heightened competition for diminished
water supplies. In California, for example, there may be less snow in the
mountains, and what snow does fall may melt and run off during the
winters rather than the springs and summers. Annual deliveries to the
California State Water Project could decline by 7% to 15%.6 At the
same time, global warming may cause the demand for electricity to in-
crease by 4% to 6% over the expected increase without global warming.
Growing competition between municipal and industrial water use and
agricultural water use will exacerbate existing supply shortfalls in dry,
populated areas, and cities may exert their political power on both the
state and federal levels to prohibit all but the most essential crops from
being irrigated. Meanwhile, efforts that began in the 1970s to allocate
more water to in situ environmental uses may literally evaporate. A
recent global warming disaster scenario includes the prediction that,
"[iln northern California, low water levels and high temperatures deoxy-
genated Tule Lake, inducing epizootics of botulism that eventually killed
off the immense flocks of ducks and geese that had made Tule the great-
est single gathering ground in the world for migratory waterfowl." 7
This Article addresses the capacity of both state water law and fed-
eral reclamation law to adapt to global warming and the resulting possi-
bility of water supply shortages as normal, rather than abnormal, events.
It then discusses the constitutional and other legal issues that will be at
the center of state growth-control debates. This Article does not address
strategies to achieve a new energy balance. Rather, it assumes that the
West faces a substantially increased risk of water shortages as a result of
global warming. The Article speculates about how the existing laws of
prior appropriation and growth-control will respond to water shortages,
when and if they occur, and predicts the likely effect of recent trends in
western water law on global warming adaptation strategies.
II. GLOBAL WARMING RESPONSE STRATEGIES:
COMMENTATORS' PROPOSALS
Two commentators have proposed three interrelated responses to
6. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
supra note 3, at 34.
7. M. OPPENHEIMER & R. BOYLE, DEAD HEAT: THE RACE AGAINST THE GREEN-
HOUSE EFFECT 11 (1990).
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global climate change: (1) further research; (2) adapt to temperature
rises; and (3) reduce the root causes of the warming or resource demand.'
The merits of the first option are clear, especially given the lack of con-
sensus in the scientific community about the magnitude of projected
warming. 9 The current debate focuses on the relative merits of the sec-
ond and third responses. 10 Ultimately, the amounts of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere must be reduced to
slow the warming. However, in order to do so, a radical change in en-
ergy generation and consumption is required, and thus, the third option
demands a radical shift in the economic and social organization of all
countries.
Throughout history, world climates have varied and civilizations
have accepted the consequences as fate. In the sixteenth century, 1
Braudel speculated about cycles of warming and cooling, as well as rain
and drought in certain Mediterranean regions during the sixteenth cen-
tury. Historically, climatic change was believed to be rooted in natural
phenomena rather than human activity.12 As a result, past societies did
not try to manage the change, and did not consider adjusting technology
to avoid the effects of global warming. 3
Global warming has forced a modest reexamination of our ability to
overcome aridity. At least one commentator argues for adoption of the
second strategy-the decade-by-decade adoption of flexible response
strategies to prepare us to live with long-term change in climate. 4 Water
shortage is one of the potential adverse effects of global warming which
can be mitigated through new management strategies. The core of any
such strategy should include better management of existing water sup-
plies, coupled with the shift in allocation of water from agricultural to
8. Id. at 157-58, 184.
9. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and International Law, 32
ARiz. L. REv. 221, 268-70 (1990).
10. Id. at 251-53 (author discusses Bush administration policy which focuses on address-
ing the effects, but argues this position is "insupportable on ethical, economic and cultural
grounds").
11. F. BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE
AGE OF PHILLIP II 267-75 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
12. See C. SILVER, ONE EARTH ONE FUTURE: OUR CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT 31-48 (1990).
13. The eighteenth century belief in human perfection through scientific progress replaced
earlier notions of human perfection that were rooted in mysticism. The modern notion of
progress flowered in the eighteenth century. It includes the belief that control, as the mastery
of nature, is a necessary element of a perfect society. See J. PASSMORE, THE PERFECTIBILITY
OF MAN 190-238 (1970).
14. See Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A Preliminary
Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375, 380-81 (1989) (reviewing the adaptive strategy debate).
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municipal, industrial and environmental uses. The question remains,
however, whether such adaptation alone will be a sufficient response
strategy.
Ultimately, adaptation to a changing climate is, at best, a temporary
strategy and may not be a substitute for more fundamental shifts in re-
source use. Globally, the answer lies in the shift from non-renewable to
renewable sources of energy and in curbing explosive population
growth.' 5 In the western United States, the answer may ultimately lie in
confronting the relationship between water demand and urban growth in
areas that are likely to experience severe long-term shortages. In all the
major arid states, unlimited population growth is assumed, and the func-
tion of water policy is perceived to merely supply all the water necessary
to accommodate this growth. Many serious observers of the West think
that this analysis is wrong. They assert that we should first set growth
limits and then temper demands to use of available, possibly diminishing
supplies of water. 16
Both the California state water resources agencies and the Bureau of
Reclamation Resources, the major federal water manager in the West,
will be affected by water shortages induced by global warming. Flexible
adaptation strategies require the ability to capture and store decreased
rain and snowfall and to move quickly the available, reduced supplies to
the areas of greatest demand. However, existing technical and institu-
tional barriers may make this adaptation difficult.
III. PRIOR APPROPRIATION: IS IT A RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?
Both California water law and federal reclamation law are based on
the law of prior appropriation. 7 Prior appropriation is a system of water
allocation to be used in times of water shortages. This system provides
clear entitlements to water by allowing users to perfect rights to surface
and groundwater"8 until water levels increase to the normal capacity of
15. F. LYMAN, THE GREENHOUSE TRAP: WHAT WE'RE DOING TO THE ATMOSPHERE
AND How WE CAN SLOW GLOBAL WARMING 106-07 (1991).
16. The growth control issue must be viewed in the larger context of an ongoing reevalua-
tion of western settlement and development over the past 150 years. Revisionist historians
stress the costs of development and the contingent nature of the success of western settlement
in the face of the region's inherent physical limitations. See, eg., P. LIMERICK, THE LEGACY
OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 134-75 (1987); D. WOR-
STER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, & THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST
259-326 (1985). For a perceptive commentary on revisionist and standard history, see McMur-
try, How the West Was Lost, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 1990, at 32.
17. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
18. California, however, does not rely primarily on prior appropriation to allocate ground-
water. Overlying landowners have correlative rights to the safe yield of a groundwater basin
[Vol. 24:979
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the stream or aquifer to supply all right holders is exhausted. 19 In the-
ory, both state and federal water agencies have a great capacity to re-
spond to global warming-induced water shortages, because the function
of western water law has been to allocate a scarce resource among com-
peting users in times of shortage.
The prior appropriation doctrine was developed in California to al-
locate water among the gold miners, and after some initial hesitation, it
spread throughout the West.2" The law endured in the face of sharp crit-
icisms about its efficiency 2 and equity22 because the law has accommo-
dated to changing use demands by expanding the classes of claimants
eligible to acquire water rights.23 Irrigators, hydroelectric generators,
cities, recreationists and spokesmen for fish and wildlife have all been
accommodated, to varying degrees. Thus, the law of prior appropriation,
supplemented by federal and state reservoir management, potentially is a
complete risk allocation strategy.
Prior appropriation allocates the risks of shortages by a simple prin-
ciple-priority of use.24 The problem is whether the extreme risks of
global climate change25 can be allocated within the framework of prior
and only if these users do not perfect rights to the safe yield may non-overlying appropriators
acquire rights to the surplus. See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d
1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975); Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
19. See C. MEYERS, A. TARLOCK, J. CORBRIDGE & D. GETCHES, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 238-342 (3d ed. 1988).
20. See M. REISNER & S. BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIs: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR
WESTERN WATER 64-65 (1990).
21. See id. at 64-66. The prior appropriation doctrine protects those parties who first
assert their rights to the water; subsequent parties, with even more compelling interests in the
water, may be left without a remedy. This is especially true today as western rivers have been
fully or over appropriated, and concerns for the environment and future supply take a backseat
to the water rights established in the 1800s and early 1900s. Id. at 65.
22. See Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 481, 492-94. Prior appropriation is
a capture type alocation scheme which "give[s] water to the swift and well-endowed, and con-
stitute[s] a user-preference rule of questionable fairness to other potential users"). Id. at 493.
23. B. GRAY, WATER TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA: 1981-1989 (1990).
24. A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5.081] (1988). A water
right is acquired by filing a notice of intent to appropriate and by then putting the water to
beneficial use within a reasonable period of time. The filing dates provide a priority schedule;
in times of shortage, diversions are limited or shut down in inverse order of priority. Id.
25. The risks of global climate change include the following: a rise in sea levels which
could cause low-lying land masses to disappear under the ocean; a shift in rainfall patterns
which could result in a massive failure of crops as farmland turns to dust; climatic changes
which could cause summers to become longer and drier while winters could become shorter
and wetter; the rise in temperature and decreased rainfall for much of the earth's current
grain-producing regions resulting in disaster for world production; and finally, animals and
forests may not adapt to the predicted rapid climate change. Woodward, supra note 3, at 203,
213-16.
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appropriation.26 Western water law is premised on shortages allocated
by priority schedules which provide a clear, complete and advanced risk
allocation scheme. However, such risks do not occur with any regular-
ity. The whole thrust of federal and state water policy from the Conser-
vation Era2 has been to minimize the risks of shortages by constructing
large carry-over storage facilities.28 In places such as California, ground-
water pumping serves the same back-up function.29 Thus, reservoirs and
groundwater basins probably will be subjected to only the mildest form
of rationing during droughts. States have tried to accommodate unlim-
ited growth on a limited water budget by providing ample margins of
safety against shortages.3" When water deliveries have been reduced or
stopped according to a strict priority schedule, the losers have generally
been small farmers, Indian tribes, fish and wildlife.3 1 Most irrigators
have been buffered against the harshness of prior appropriation by carry-
over storage and formal and informal mechanisms that share the burdens
of shortages by pro rata rather than pro tanto delivery reductions.32
Thus, although the law of prior appropriation is a risk allocation mecha-
nism, the expectation that it will be used during water shortages on a
large scale is low.
The strong expectations of user security will especially impede the
Federal Bureau of Reclamation Resources (the Bureau) should it seek to
introduce flexibility, such as reallocation, into its mission.33 Historically,
26. There are two major problems with the use of prior appropriation for risk allocation.
First, the law has never been used for this function. Therefore, there are major political, insti-
tutional and legal barriers to declaring winners and losers, which must be done if water is to be
allocated in times of severe water shortages. Second, the risk allocation schedules produced by
the strict application of prior appropriation will be widely perceived as perverse; the highest
priorities are often the lowest valued uses.
27. The Conservation Era was the period between 1891 and 1920 when the federal govern-
ment ended the policy of disposing of all public lands and the police power was extended to the
regulation of all natural resources. See generally Tarlock, The Changing Meaning of Water
Conservation in the West, 66 NE. L. REv. 145 (1987).
28. See M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEAR-
ING WATER (1986) for a history of the politics of the damming of the West.
29. Id. at 10.
30. For example, Los Angeles water planners use a strategy of constructing projects in a
pattern that is designed to keep the actual water supply a step ahead of population projections.
Parsons & Mathews, The Californiazation of 4rizona Water Politics, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J.
341, 352 (1990).
31. See C. MEYERS, A. TARLOCK, J. COR3RIDGE & D. GETCHES, supra note 19, at 779 for
a discussion of the hardships suffered during the 1980s by the first tribe to win an Indian
reserved water right.
32. But see the conclusion of Professor Leshy that "prior appropriation more resembles a
ghost of the past than a vibrant contemporary presence." Leshy, The PriorAppropriation Doc-
trine of Water Law in the West: An Emperor with Few Clothes, 29 J.W. 5, 12 (1990).
33. The bureau has been responsible for providing water for farms, towns, and industries;
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that mission has been to support local users by minimizing the risks of
shortages by providing sufficient carry-over storage facilities to keep
water flowing downstream from its reservoirs during dry years.34 Fear of
shortage has been used as the rationale for constructing large projects
and has pushed other adaptation strategies off the political agenda.35
The issue that prior appropriation poses for global warming adjust-
ment strategies is how flexible the system will be in shifting water to
areas of greatest need and in promoting maximum access to a scarce re-
source. Adapting to global warming places a premium on both technical
and allocative efficiency. Users in water-short areas will have to conserve
existing supplies by using less.36 Economists and many western water
critics have long criticized western water law because it ignores higher,
alternative values of water.37 They assert that too much water is used to
grow surplus or low-valued crops and too much water is used in a waste-
ful manner.38 In almost all areas of the West, agriculture took prece-
dence over large urban concentrations in receiving water. For most of
this century, water allocation has been relatively static because the three
major uses-agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, and municipal
and industrial use-were able to share the available water supply without
unduly disrupting each other; but now this allocation is perceived as per-
verse.39 For example, the highest demand on the Colorado River is for
irrigation, although the highest values of water are for municipal and
industrial supplies and the enhancement of environmental values. Per-
the generation of hydroelectric power; river regulation and flood control; outdoor recreation;
and wildlife habitat preservation in the Western United States. See D. DAWDY, CONGRESS IN
ITS WISDOM: THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1-6 (1989).
34. This model of natural disaster is the seven-year cycle of plenty and famine experienced
by Egypt in the book of Genesis, rather than Anasazi long-term drought scenarios. Compare
Genesis 41:47-57 (Egypt) with Kneese & Bonem, Hypothetical Shocks to Water Allocation In-
stitutions in the Colorado Basin, in NEw COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 87, 106 (G.
Weatherford & F. Brown eds. 1986) (Anasazi). Tree ring investigations at Chaco Canyon
posit an extreme drought between 1130 and 1180 A.D., which appears to have driven the
Anasazi from the Colorado plateau. Id. Just as the Pharaoh heeded Joseph's advice and
stored the harvests of plenty, Genesis 41:47-57, 53:33-57, so too has the Bureau heeded the
vision of scientists and western promoters by storing spring runoffs in wet years for reserve in
dry years.
35. W. STEGNER, THE AMERICAN WEST AS LIVING SPACE 47-49 (1986); see also M.
REISNER, supra note 28, at 500, 504-05.
36. See State To Shut Off Water Delivery to Southland, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al,
col. 2; Wilson Directs Plans Begin for 50% Water Cuts, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1991, at Al, col.
2.
37. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 260-61 (1973).
38. M. REISNER & S. BATES, supra note 20, at 58.
39. See id.
June 1991]
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verse priorities are not an absolute barrier, though, because water can be
reallocated among users voluntarily.'
Until recently, many believed that the allocation of western water
was eternal. In reality, however, the allocation system was never com-
pletely static. It has always contained reallocation mechanisms to allow
minor adjustments in use patterns.4 ' These adjustments-transfers in
the shift of water from its intial use to another use-were, however, the
exception rather than the norm. Today, the exception may become the
norm. There is a growing consensus in the national environmental com-
munity42 and among urban suppliers43 that water should be reallocated
from agricultural uses to municipal, industrial and instream uses in order
to protect a broad range of environmental and recreational values.
Prior appropriation contains two principles that could become the
basis for global climate adaptation. First, appropriation rights are fully
transferable usufactuary property rights.' The original vision of the
West as a land of small irrigators assumed that water rights should be
tied to the soil. Most states, however, have rejected this principle, and
water rights are transferrable property rights.4" Second, water has a so-
cial value: it should only be used for a beneficial purpose. In this cen-
tury, beneficial use has been defined as non-wasteful use." Waste has
long been defined by local custom, 47 with the result that few irrigation
practices are found to be non-beneficial. A redefined concept of benefi-
cial use could play a larger role in the future.48
40. The success of voluntary allocation, however, remains to be seen.
41. See A. TARLOCK, NEW WATER TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS: THE WEST RETURNS TO
RIPARIANISM (1991).
42. A. TARLOCK, supra note 24, § 8.04[3].
43. See Z. WILLEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN
CALIFORNIA'S WATER SYSTEM 8-10 (1985).
44. A. TARLOCK, supra note 24, § 5.17[2].
45. See B. GRAY, supra note 23.
46. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blue Print for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483,
488-89 (1982).
47. Id. at 491.
48. For example, beneficial use could be defined as efficient use. Under the efficient use
doctrine, water conservation measures may focus on the use which produces the greatest eco-
nomic benefit. The system imposed on the Newlands Project in the Truckee-Carson basin of
western Nevada is a possible model for applying the beneficial doctrine as the theoretical basis
for increased rural and urban water-use conservation requirements. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NEWLANDS PROJECT, PRO-
POSED OPERATING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES (May 1986). The beneficial use doctrine can
be complemented by the public trust doctrine. The classic public trust doctrine recognizes
public servitudes to use navigable waters for commerce and recreation and prevents the aliena-
tion of the beds of these waters without a clear showing of public benefit. Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In California, this doctrine has been used to reallocate vested
[Vol. 24:979
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Water marketing has been endorsed by the national environmental
community as well as by urban suppliers. 9 Transfers can be used for
both urban and environmental uses with minimum disruption of existing
users. Water marketing could be the cornerstone of an adaptive strategy
because water can be shifted to areas of highest demand, regardless of its
original priority and use. The agreement between the Imperial Irrigation
District (1ID) and the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of Southern
California could be a model of future voluntary water transfers.5 0 MWD
has paid 1ID $120,000,000 to save 100,000 acre feet of water. This water
will be added to the otherwise lower priority of urban use in Los
Angeles.
1
The water transfer debate centers on two related issues. First, what
are the barriers to transfers? Although most western water rights are
transferable, the transaction costs of a transfer can be high. The vested
rights of third parties must be protected under state law and, in an in-
creasing number of states, transfers are subject to public interest re-
view. 2 At present, these barriers do not present insurmountable barriers
to transfers. A comprehensive survey of water transfers in six western
states53 found that a variety of transfers occur both among similar users
rights to trust purposes which include environmental protection. See National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360, cert
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). In addition, some commentators have argued that the public
trust doctrine requires reductions in water use and the reallocation of water to dilution flows to
redress the adverse effects of agricultural run-off. See, eg., Johnson, Water Pollution and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485, 512 (1989).
49. See, eg., Z. WILLEY, supra note 43, at 3 n.4.
50. Water Conservation Agreement Between the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California and Imperial Irrigation District (Dec. 1989).
51. Personal conversation with Dr. Henry Vaux, Jr., University of California at Riverside,
El Centro, California (Apr. 20, 1990).
52. County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1973) (equivalent
land exchange violated public trust when amount of tideland conveyed was excessive); People
ex rel Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 79-81, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1976) (benefit
of legislative transfer of land beneath Lake Michigan to private company was "too indirect,
intangible and elusive to satisfy the requirement of a public purpose"); Milwaukee v. State, 193
Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927) (submerged land trade approved because objective of trade was
to benefit public and no substantial interference with public right).
Utah recently interpreted its transfer statute to include public interest review. Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989). An Idaho trial judge has ruled that section 42-211 of
the Idaho Code allows the Department of Water Resources to invite protests in change of
place of diversion proceedings from third parties beyond those in the immediate area of the
diversion. Hardy v. Higginson, Case No. 92599 (Idaho Dist. Ct. July 25, 1990) upheld the
power of the State Engineer to impose conditions on diversions from the critical habitat of a
candidate fish for listing under the Endangered Species Act. See Grant, Public Interest Review
in Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 1987 ARIz.
ST. LJ. 681.
53. UNIVERSITY OF COLO. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, THE WATER TRANS-
June 1991]
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and from existing to new uses.14 The transaction costs vary from mini-
mal to very high in Colorado, but most state laws support water transfers
and such transfers are taking place in response to market demand." The
second issue is the relative range of third-party interests with a stake in
the transfers, and this will loom larger in the future as the non-commod-
ity values of water use increase.
Western states and the federal government are in the process of ex-
panding the range of protected third-party interests in all phases of water
allocation.56 In the past few decades, states have begun to include a vari-
ety of previously excluded interests in the allocation and the transfer pro-
cess." As a result, environmental representatives, Indian tribes, ethnic
communities and areas of water origin now have a greater stake in water
allocation processes than they had in the past. The net result of these
developments has been to complicate water transfers and to make the
system potentially less adaptive. As one commentator has observed,
water transfers are more like diplomatic negotiations than commercial
transactions.5" The expanded compass of legitimate interests poses new
challenges to the water community to distinguish between good and bad
transfer barriers and to develop evaluation processes that strike a balance
between restraint and reallocation.
IV. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION RESOURCES
A. Transfers
The twenty-seven million acre feet of water supplied by the Bureau
to farmers throughout the West 9 has started a roll in water marketing.6°
Federal reclamation projects have been identified as a major source of
water for municipal and industrial and environmental uses.61 Reclama-
tion projects use large amounts of subsidized water, often at low techni-
cal efficiencies. But, the Bureau faces two major institutional barriers to
FER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS
(1990). See B. GRAY, supra note 23, for a discussion of the California water transfer system.
54. B. GRAY, supra note 23, at 65.
55. Id. at 66.
56. See Tarlock, supra note 27.
57. Id.
58. Personal conversation with Professor Joseph L. Sax, University of California at Berke-
ley, Newport Beach, Cal., (Oct. 19, 1990). See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1968).
59. R. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 147 (1989).
60. Id. at 125-33.
61. Id. at 127-33.
[Vol. 24:979
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reallocating the supplies that it controls in order to adapt to global
warming. First, reclamation law creates strong expectations that the
original project beneficiaries will be the eternal beneficiaries of project
water. Consequently, every proposed transfer or conservation require-
ment that might induce transfers will be met with substantial, although
not insurmountable, opposition. Second, the Bureau's attempt to recast
its perceived reputation from a polluter of western waters to a true multi-
purpose manager may be inconsistent with global climate change adapta-
tion because more water must be left in situ.
Efforts to promote efficiency through both increases in the cost of
water and related conservation plans have not been aggressively pursued,
although the law is clear that there is no constitutional right to federally
subsidized water.62 Water marketing advocates argue that voluntary
transfers may overcome beneficiary resistance to transfers and "can be as
effective as appropriate pricing in leading to efficient use of water."6
There are, however, many legal and political barriers to the move-
ment of reclamation water away from their original projects. Federal rec-
lamation law was designed to promote family farms."4 The legacy of this
largely unsuccessful experiment is that the law provides no incentives for
transfers. A leading expert has concluded "reclamation law is devoid of
any explicit Bureau water transfer policy."6
Transfers of project water may take place under both federal and
state law,66 but the prevailing assumption is that they will be the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 190267
provides in part:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended
to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distri-
bution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out
the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
62. See Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 517 (1990).
63. R. WAHL, supra note 59, at 130.
64. Id. at21.
65. Driver, The Effect of Reclamation Law on Voluntary Transfers of Water, 33 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 26-1, 26-7 (1987).
66. For a detailed discussion of reclamation law, see Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance
of the Right To Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13
ECOLOGY L.Q. 773 (1987). Transfer of reclamation project water must comply with the re-
quirements of both federal and state law. United States v. Alpine & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d
1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 1989).
67. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e (1988).
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such laws .... 6
Section 8 was initially construed to classify the Bureau as "simply a car-
rier and distributor of water.., with the right to receive the sums stipu-
lated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and
annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works." 69 In the
wake of the New Deal expansion of federal powers, the Supreme Court
held that Congress may preempt state law,70 but the Court has recently
interpreted section 8 to erect a presumption against preemption.71 In
1983, the Court again described federal ownership of rights as "at most
nominal" because the beneficial interest was held by owners of project
land.72
Section 8 could also be the basis for a federal policy that prohibits
transfers, but it has never been construed to prohibit the transfer of "sur-
plus" project waters.73 Section 8 provides that "[t]he right to the use of
water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to
the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right."7 4 Fortunately, the outmoded principle of ap-
purtenancy has eroded from the subsequent acts that allow the use of
water for municipal and industrial use. For example, the Reclamation
Project Act of 193975 allows the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation to impound water for non-irrigation uses.76 Thus, there is
no per se barrier to the reallocation of project waters to non-project uses.
The major barrier will be the requirement embedded in reclamation law
that the repayment ability of the project be impaired. Non-impairment,
68. Id. § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 383.
69. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937).
70. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-67 (1963) (federal allocation in times of
shortage); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 629-31 (1963) (federal preference for
irrigation); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291-92 (1958) (acreage
limitation).
71. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-79 (1978).
72. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983).
73. See El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v. City of El Paso, 133 F. Supp.
894, 919-20 (W.D. Tex. 1955), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 820 (1957).
74. 43 U.S.C. § 372.
75. Pub. L. No. 76-418, 53 Stat. 1187 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 485-485k
(1988) and other scattered sections of Title 43).
76. "[I]t is provided that storage may be included in any reservoir project surveyed,
planned, constructed or to be planned, surveyed and/or constructed by ... Bureau of Recla-
mation to impound water for present or anticipated future demand or need for municipal or
industrial water .. " 43 U.S.C. § 3906(b) (1988).




however, is at the heart of Bureau-project contracts. 78 Therefore, trans-
fers must also comply with the provisions of the individual federal pro-
ject contracts.
All contracts require the Secretary of the Interior to approve any
modification.79 The principal interest that the federal government will
assert is to guarantee that the transfer will not impair the payment of the
project's construction costs or the annual payment of operation and
maintenance costs.80 Individual Bureau-project contracts may present
additional problems. For example, most projects generate return flows,
8'
but control of these flows varies.82 Some contracts give the United States
control over the flows for project use;8 3 other contracts give the district
power to use them within the district;84 or, in the case of the Central
Arizona Project, the contract gives the district power to sell the flows.
85
Recent changes in the Bureau's policy indicate a greater receptivity
to transfers,8 6 but the new policies do not eliminate the long-standing
bias toward appurtenancy in federal reclamation law. Late in 1988, the
Bureau, in its new capacity as management, as opposed to its engineering
function, announced a seven-principle transfer policy.87 The policy does
not, however, amount to a radical switch to water marketing. It reaf-
firms the Bureau's traditional deference to state law and generally an-
nounces a reactive as opposed to proactive position on transfers. For
example, the Bureau will become involved only where there is a potential
effect on federal projects and services, and the transfer has been re-
quested by an appropriate non-federal political authority.88 The major
exception to this passive stance are transfer agreements that are part of
an Indian water rights settlement, of which there are many--either al-
ready negotiated or currently being negotiated.8 9 The policy reaffirms
the protection of third-party interests and the mitigation of adverse envi-
78. See Roos-Collins, supra note 66, at 785-86.
79. 43 U.S.C. § 485b-1 (deferment of repayment); Sax, supra note 77, § 123.2(c); see also
R. WAHL, supra note 59, at 157.
80. See Roos-Collins, supra note 66, at 812-18.
81. R. WAHL, supra note 59, at 171.
82. See Roos-Collins, supra note 66, at 831-34.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See R. WAHL, supra note 59, at 171-72.
86. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSAC-
TIONS THAT INVOLVE OR AFFECT FACILITIES OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR 88-89 (Dec. 16, 1988).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 89.
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ronmental effects.' Water will not be transferred unless adverse third-
party effects can be avoided or mitigated.91 The question is whether pro-
ject beneficiaries can receive the current market value of subsidized
water, or whether the government should recapture some or all of the
value added by decades of underpriced water. The policy simply states
that transfers will not be burdened with costs beyond those actually in-
curred.92 This response seems inadequate, although many analysts argue
that subsidy recapture should be subordinated to the removal of transfer
restrictions in order to promote efficiency. Still, subsidy recapture will be
an issue in both contract renewals and transfers.
B. Reservoir Operation
The Bureau operates large carry-over storage reservoirs throughout
the West.93 Bureau operations are subject to varying levels of discre-
tion,94 but such levels may decrease because of severe shortages caused
by global climate change. Projects may actually have to be operated to
meet legally binding allocations rather than to maximize power revenues,
and this could result in perverse water allocations. Bureau projects are
subject to a complex state and federal scheme of priorities and prefer-
ences, and these priorities and preferences vary from reservoir to
reservoir.
The legal position of the Bureau is not clear. Again, the orthodox
analysis is that the Bureau is only a carrier for water allocated by state
law. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 190291 requires that the Bureau
perfect project water rights under state law.96 This analysis was devel-
oped at a time when the Bureau's powers, as limited by the constitution,
were not as broad as they are now,97 and the Bureau operated smaller-
90. Id.
91. Id. This policy only touches on the volatile issue of subsidy recapture.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., McCurdy, Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683, 699 (1989).
94. See B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, WHO RUNS THE RIVERS IN THE WEST: DAMS
AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW WEST (1983).
95. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1988).
96. Id.
97. The expansion of the Bureau of Reclamation's power is a function of the twentieth
century view that the federal government's power to implement national regulatory and sub-
sidy programs is virtually limitless. In 1907, the Supreme Court dismissed the federal govern-
ment's petition to intervene in an equitable apportionment action because the only power that
they could identify to justify the federal reclamation program was the power to acquire and
govern territories. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907). The Court also said that
this power to acquire and govern territories did not preempt state law. Id. at 92. By 1950,
Congress justified the program under the spending power, United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737-38 (1950), and established an almost conclusive presumption that fed-
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scale projects.98 Congress may preempt state law and delegate to the
Secretary of the Interior the power to operate reservoirs to allocate water
as he or she chooses. 99 Thus, the modem rule is that the federal govern-
ment must presumptively follow state law unless Congress has chosen to
preempt it.
The carrier analysis works to structure the operation of small Bu-
reau reservoirs. The Bureau stores the maximum amount of water possi-
ble during the spring run-off and uses it during the irrigation season,
refusing to honor requests for water only if there is not enough water to
satisfy holders of senior water rights. The carrier analogy may be legally
correct on large multi-purpose reservoirs as well, but it is often irrele-
vant. The amount of water available gives the Bureau considerable dis-
cretion to operate the reservoir to maximize the uses it prefers. As long
as supplies are relatively abundant over a three- or four-year period,
there is usually a difference between the dejure operating rules and the
de facto operating procedures.
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River provides an example of
the change in operating procedures that may be caused by severe
shortages."l° Glen Canyon Dam is the linchpin of the management of
the Colorado River because it enables the upper basin states to store suffi-
cient water to meet their ten-year delivery obligations to the lower basin
states.1"1 Paradoxically, the law of the river controls the yearly opera-
tion of the dam, but does not constrain daily operations for power gener-
ation. The reasons are that the law of the river only affects power
generation in the case of long-term extreme shortage,10 2 but the law of
reservoir operations is a law of annual fill targets.
10 3
Glen Canyon Dam was constructed as part of the Colorado River
Storage Project Act"° to provide a large reserve to enable the upper ba-
eral law preempted state law. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95
(1958). The presumption is now the opposite, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670-
79 (1978), but Congress's power to preempt state law remains unquestioned.
98. See M. REISNER, supra note 28, at 118-24.
99. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963) (affirming broad powers of the
Secretary in administering the River).
100. See H. Ingrain, A. Tarlock & C. Oggins, The Law and Politics of the Operation of
Glen Canyon Dam, Water Science and Technology Board, Symposium on Colorado River
Ecology and Dam Management (to be published by National Academy Press, 1991).
101. D. Getches, Water Allocation During Drought in Arizona and California: Legal and
Institutional Resources (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado Law School,
1991).
102. See Getches & Meyers, The River of Controversy: Persistent Issues, in NEw CouRSEs
FOR THE COLORADO RIVER, supra note 34, at 51, 61-62.
103. See 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1988).
104. Id. §§ 620-620o.
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sin to withstand prolonged periods of drought and still meet its obliga-
tion under the 1922 Colorado River Compact"0 5 to deliver to the lower
basin 75 million acre feet of water every ten years in perpetuity. °6 Be-
cause the irrigation and other projects in the upper Colorado River could
never pass a strict cost-benefit analysis and could not be subsidized by the
beneficiaries, the upper basin states used hydroelectric power revenues
from the storage projects to cover a large percentage of the repayment
obligations. Glen Canyon Dam is presently operated to maximize power
revenues, although hydroelectric generation is a low priority use on the
river.
In theory, Glen Canyon Dam is controlled by the law of the river,
which is a complex mass of compacts, international agreements, statutes,
judicial decrees and informal operating procedures. In practice, how-
ever, it is controlled by the Bureau and Western Area Power Administra-
tion operators who manage it much as banks operate automatic teller
machines. The current concern is over the adverse effects of pulsating
flows on the riverain environment of the Grand Canyon, but global
warming could effect the dam's virtually unrestricted use for power gen-
eration in other ways. Law is largely irrelevant to day-to-day operations
because the law of the river is only a law of mass allocations between
regions and among states. The compacts which form the core of the law
reflect the prevailing water-use values at the time of their negotiation.
The negotiators of the 1922 Colorado River Compact (the Compact)
assumed that they were dividing an average annual flow at Lee's Ferry,
Arizona of 16 million acre feet.107 Article III(a) of the Compact appor-
tioned "in perpetuity" the "exclusive beneficial consumptive use" of 7.5
105. 46 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3000 (1929).
106. Colorado River Compact, Nov. 24, 1922, art. 111(a), reprinted in R. OLSON, THE COL-
ORADO RIVER COMPACT app. II, exh. A at 226 (1926).
107. See R. OLSON, THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT 34 (1926).
Prior to the passage of the Colorado River Basin Project Act in 1968 the Lower
Basin states of California, Arizona, and Nevada decided to agree on a water-supply
study and make a joint presentation on water supply to the House Subcommittee on
Irrigation and Reclamation. Engineers making the study agreed to do a probability
study based on methods developed by Luna Leopold, formerly chief hydraulic engi-
neer of the United States Geological Survey. In their testimony, they concluded that
there is a fifty-fifty chance that the supply available in the main stream will equal or
be greater than the amount needed to provide: (1) 4.4 million acre-feet a year for
California (this is the amount awarded California in 1963 by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)); (2) water for decreed
rights and existing mainstream projects in Arizona and Nevada and the southern
Nevada water-supply project; (3) water for increasing demands on the Upper Basin;
and (4) a full supply of 1.2 million acre-feet for the prroposed [sic] Central Arizona
Project until about the end of the century, with a gradually reduced supply
afterwards.
Kneese & Bonem, supra note 34, at 91; see also Getches & Meyer, supra note 102, at 59.
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million acre feet of water per annum to each basin.' The lower basin
was given the additional right to the assumed 1 million acre feet sur-
plus.109 In anticipation of the assertion of claims for water by Mexico,
the Mexican burden was divided equally between Colorado and Ari-
zona. 110 The hydroelectric power generated in the lower basin is gov-
erned by two provisions of article III. The first, article III(d), provides
that the upper basin states will not cause the flow at Lee's Ferry to be
depleted by 75 million acre feet for any consecutive ten-year periods."'
The second, article III(e), provides that the upper basin states cannot
withhold the delivery of water "which cannot reasonably be applied to
domestic and agricultural uses.""' 2 A reciprocal duty imposed on the
lower basin to not demand deliveries on the same condition" 3 is mean-
ingless because the lower basin puts all of its entitlement to domestic and
agricultural uses. The only mention of power is in article IV, which sub-
ordinates the use of the river for navigation to "domestic, agricultural
and power purposes.""' 4
The relationship between power generation and other uses of the
Colorado River has been the subject of some speculation among com-
mentators," 5 but there has not yet been a conflict that tests the relation-
ship. The upper basin's ten-year delivery obligation is absolute" 6 and,
thus, the upper basin states are precluded from objecting to the use of
this water for power generation before it is consumed by the lower basin
states. In order for the upper basin to avoid its delivery obligation, there
would have to be a prolonged drought which would make it impossible
for the upper basin to meet its obligation, and the lower basin states
would have to be seeking the release of water for power generation.' '
7
The late Dean Meyers suggested that, if lower basin consumptive de-
mands are met, article III(e) prohibits the lower basin from demanding
water solely for power generation" 8 because the compact expresses a
108. Colorado River Compact, art. III (a), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II,
exh. A at 226.
109. Id. art. III(b), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 226.
110. Id. art. III(c), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 226.
111. Id. art. III(d), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 227.
112. Id. art. III(e), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 227.
113. Id., reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 227.
114. Id. art. IV(a), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at 227.
115. See, e.g., Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REv.
413 (1985); Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1966).
116. Colorado River Compact, art. III(d), reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II,
exh. A at 227.
117. See Meyers, supra note 115, at 20-22.
118. Id. at 20.
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clear preference for domestic and agricultural uses over power
generation.119
As it is now defined, the Bureau would have to let water come
through the dam regardless of power contracts to serve these priority
uses. 20 Similarly, the ten-year obligation may be a basis for the upper
basin states to require that water not needed for immediate downstream
priority uses be stored in Glen Canyon Dam as a reserve against their 75
million per decade delivery obligation.
12 1
C. New Interests
Management of the Colorado River in normal and severe drought is
further complicated by the recent efforts to accommodate new interests.
The post-Compact experience on the Colorado River with the accommo-
dation of new interests contains mixed lessons for global warming scena-
rios. Three major classes of uses were traditionally excluded by the
reclamation era allocation: recreation, environmental quality (both pub-
lic health and fish and wildlife habitat enhancement) and Indian claims.
Most of the major developments in water law have revolved around the
incorporation of these values at the federal and state level.
In 1922, the full range of relevant interests was not represented in
the negotiations. The two most obvious exclusions were Indian tribes
and the government of Mexico. The Supreme Court, in Winters v.
United States,122 held that Indian tribes have a super priority to large
amounts of water.' 23 Federal reserved rights may also be claimed by
federal land management agencies,1 24 and there is an argument that the
Grand Canyon National Park enabling legislation 125 allows the National
Park Service to assert a federal reserved water right to protect the ecolog-
119. Colorado River Compact, reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II, exh. A at
227.
120. Hundley observes that for a possible future treaty with Mexico, the delegates con-
cluded that any such obligation should be met with surplus water, and if that proved insuffi-
cient, then the two basins should share equally the burden. N. HUNDLEY, WATER AND THE
WEST 203-04 (1975). This provision reflected a desire to cover an important contingency
rather than sympathy for people in Mexico. "We do not believe they ever had any rights,"
observed Herbert Hoover. Id. at 204. The Indians in the Colorado River Basin hardly fared
better. Their rights were considered "negligible" and were dealt with perfunctorily in what
Hoover called his "wild Indian article: Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting
the obligations of the United Sates of America to Indian tribes." Id. at 211-12.
121. Getches, supra note 115, at 449.
122. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
123. Id. at 575-78 (allocation not based upon prior use but upon reserved rights).
124. Arizona v. California, 377 U.S. 546 (1963).
125. 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (Supp. 1991).
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ical integrity of the Grand Canyon. 12 6 These rights are assumed by the
state in which the reservation lies. 27 Likewise, the government of Mex-
ico obtained water rights both by its treaty with California 2 ' and by
subsequent international agreements. 2 9
The accommodation of newer resource values, such as the use of the
Colorado River for habitat maintenance, recreation and the stabilization
of riparian corridors such as the Grand Canyon, has proved more diffi-
cult. These interests can be recognized through the creation of new
rights, but their protection requires management of the river. The web of
interconnected statutes, international agreements and cases that make up
the law of the Colorado River 3 ' is not designed to manage the river for
the full range of resource values. All states have resisted management
because of a fear that it would dilute their water use rights guaranteed by
the 1922 Compact.' 3 ' This defect in the law of the river is becoming
more acute as new values assert themselves.
126. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
373-96 (2d ed. 1987); Wilkinson, Water Rights and the Duties of the National Park Service: A
Callfor Action at a Critical Juncture, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL
PARKS 261 (D. Simon ed. 1988); Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting the National Parks
Through Wild and Scenic River Designation, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS, supra, at 331.
127. Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian Water Rights and Interstate Water
Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 631 (1987).
128. 59 Stat. 1219 (1944); see Meyers & Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mex-
ico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
129. See T. MILLER, G. WEATHERFORD & J. THORSON, THE SALTY COLORADO (1986).
130. A leading Colorado River expert, Edward R. Clyde of Salt Lake City, Utah, offered
the following definition of the "law of the river" in 1987:
[T]he Colorado River Compact negotiated in 1922, which divided the Colorado
River between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin states; a treaty between the
United States and Mexico dated February 3, 1944; the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact negotiated in October, 1948; the apportionment made by Congress in the
enactment and implementation of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, as de-
clared by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California; federal statutes
dealing with salinity on the Colorado River and the management of the federally
constructed reservoirs; the laws of the individual states, which control individual use;
and the Indian reserved rights. Beyond this we will have the continuing role of Con-
gress which has the constitutional authority to intervene in the river administration
and water allocation.
E. Clyde, Institutional Responses to Prolonged Drought, Report to Central Utah Water Con-
servation District Directors (Feb. 12, 1987) (citation omitted). The description is a concise
summary of the common understanding of the "law of the River," but it gives too little weight
to the emergence of environmental values. For example, Senator John McCain of Arizona
recently reintroduced the Grand Canyon Protection Act which requires the Secretary of the
Interior to operate Glen Canyon dam to protect natural resources of the Grand Canyon. See
S. 144, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S. 831 (1991).
131. See Colorado River Compact, art. III, reprinted in R. OLSON, supra note 106, app. II,
exh. A at 226-27.
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New values are incorporated in federal statutes passed after the 1922
Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act,132 but these new statutes
are not well-integrated into the law of the river.133 In the 1960s, Con-
gress began to enact a number of national environmental statutes, includ-
ing the Clean Water Act' and the Endangered Species Act. 135 These
statutes superimpose environmental protection mandates onto existing
water allocation regimes without specifying the extent to which prior al-
locations are modified,1 36 but the few court cases involving these statutes
suggest that existing allocations must be accommodated to accomplish
the federal objectives.
137
Indian water rights are protected under the Winters doctrine. 38 In-
dians assert large claims to both surface and groundwater. The issue
with respect to Indian water rights is the range of uses to which water
can be put. Western water users take the analysis of Winters literally and
argue that these rights are restricted for on-reservation agricultural
use.139 The Indian tribes generally claim the right to put water uses to
the full range of modern beneficial uses and to lease them off the reserva-
tion. 1 1 Off-reservation use has been allowed on an ad hoc basis in recent
Indian water rights settlements 1 ' and, thus, some Indian water rights
may be put into the pool of water available to respond to global warming
induced demands.
Recreation and environmental uses are at risk because they are jun-
ior in fact and in law. These uses are just beginning to get rights status
under state law. Generally, under federal law they are protected as regu-
latory property rights. However, when they are recognized, they have a
low defacto or dejure priority. Thus, they would probably be the first to
be curtailed in a global warming management scenario. The recent in-
corporation of environmental values on the Colorado River illustrates
their fragile legal status and the challenges ahead for the Bureau to as-
132. See 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1988).
133. See supra notes 17-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of both California and
federal water reclamation law.
134. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
136. See id.; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
137. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758
F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
138. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
139. The argument is considered and rejected in Moore, Native American Water Rights:
Efficiency and Fairness, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 763, 782 (1989).
140. See Lichtenfels, Indian Reserved Water Rights: An Argument for the Right To Export
and Sell, 24 LAND & WATER L. REv. 131 (1989); Moore, supra note 139, at 784 n.67.
141. See Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982) (codi-
fied as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e (1988)).
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sure that global warming does not destroy the gains made as a result of
the recognition of the value of protecting natural environments to the
maximum extent possible.
VI. WATER AND GROWTH
The global climate change responses discussed in the previous sec-
tions assume that the primary objectives of water allocation are to move
water from low to high valued uses. Permanent and temporary realloca-
tions from irrigated agriculture to urban and environmental uses will be
the linchpin of any short or long-term drought response strategy, but
reallocation is not the only strategy. Western water managers assume
that continued demand for urban uses is a given and that it is their duty
to find the water to supply this demand. Continued water supply de-
mand is not, however, a given, because continued western population in
extreme arid areas is not a given. Water demand can be limited by ad-
justing population growth to the capacity of an area to assure adequate
supplies for the full range of socially valued uses under expected condi-
tions of climate variability.
A. The Non-Debate and its Reasons
Historically, the political agenda in the West has neglected the use
of growth control techniques to reduce water demand. 42 Western water
policy has historically been premised on the promotion of regional
growth. 143 Suppression of this debate on growth control is no longer
rational. Except for the northern tier of the West and parts of the Great
Plains, the West is fully settled. Nevertheless, the western states remain
driven by the nineteenth century promotion of western settlement and
continue to take the need for growth as an article of faith. Sparsely
populated states try to induce further growth, and other states which
attract growth because of climate and other amenities take growth as a
given. Responses vary between active promotion and grudging accom-
modation. The water issues in the West are framed in terms of how to
meet urban growth. 14 The recent Environmental Protection Agency
142. See, e.g, IDAHO CONsT. art. 15, § 3. Adopted in 1890, the article provides that the
right to divert and appropriate the water of any natural stream shall never be denied. Id. An
Idaho citizen might challenge the grant of public land and water under the doctrine of appro-
priation, but "such a heretic would have no more chance of being elected to office or appointed
to the Idaho Supreme Court than an advocate of gun control." Reed, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Idaho, 19 ENVTL. L. 655, 656 (1989).
143. Parsons & Mathews, supra note 30, at 350.
144. Parsons and Mathews argue that laws such as the Arizona Groundwater Management
Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to 655 (1987), "directly serve elite urban growth and
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(EPA) veto of the Twin Forks Dam project on the South Platte River in
Colorado1"5 to preserve downstream wetlands is incomprehensible to
most of the Denver water community because it questions its fundamen-
tal value of satisfying urban growth. To them, and most of the West,
questioning whether growth should occur is heretical-this analysis, is
however, reversed. The first step should be to define more precisely the
natural limitations imposed by the harsh environment. Then, states
should set growth limits and then use them to temper water demands and
make a more realistic, comprehensive use of available and possibly re-
duced supplies.
The debate is now gradually changing as environmental groups gain
more power throughout the West and the consequences of drought re-
quire real choices. The twin spectors of short-term drought and long-
term diminished supplies of water caused by global warming have in-
creased public awareness of the gravity of the issues. 146 As California
enters its fifth year of a prolonged drought, water policy is gaining a
political immediacy that it has lacked in recent years. Growth limitation
will no longer be a marginal, throw-away option as it has in the past.147
This section explores the legal ramifications of reducing water de-
mand rather than accomodating demand. The case for water demand
reduction is the stark reality of aridity. Southern California, Arizona,
New Mexico, parts of Texas, and much of the Great Basin are desert. 148
Originally, most people shunned these areas, but modern technology and
an appreciation of year-round outdoor life make these attractive areas in
which to live. The settlement of these areas can be viewed as a triumph
for the enlightenment view that man can master nature, but in the eyes of
many perceptive critics of the modern West, this thesis is the triumph of
development values and only symbolically address interests in favor of conservation, environ-
mentalism, and growth control." Parsons & Mathews, supra note 30, at 343. The authors
trace the growth of elites from the formative stages in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries through the "Golden Age of Concrete" to the present, and conclude the water sup-
pliers of Los Angeles and Phoenix still retain great power in the face of challenges by "periph-
eral actors" such as environmentalists. Id. at 358-59.
145. See Big Water Supply Plan Gets Final Veto by EPA, Engineering News-Record, Sept. 7,
1989, at 12.
146. Allen, Hot Topic Hits Home Builders, Buyers May Pay for the Greenhouse Effect, Chi-
cago Tribune, Nov. 19, 1988, at 1, zone C.
147. Reinhold, Drought Puts California at Brink of Most Drastic Water Curbs Ever, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 1991, at Al, col. 1; see also L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1991, at A37, col. 2 (Gover-
nor Wilson of California urged Californians to conserve water, while California Assembly
Speaker Willie Brown noted that the legislature must begin to pass strict growth management
plans).
148. J. GERAGHTY, D. MILLER, F. VAN DER LEEDEN & F. TROISE, WATER ATLAS o
THE UNITED STATES, plate 2 (1973).
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an illusion. In his influential book, The American West As Living Space,
Wallace Stegner articulated the position that aridity imposes limits on
human settlement that can only be ignored at our peril. 149
Efforts to limit growth in accordance with long-term water availabil-
ity can be attacked on two legal grounds. They offend either the cluster
of federal constitutional doctrines designed to promote the free flow of
goods and persons across state lines'50 or the core principle of public
utility law that water providers have a duty to serve market demand.''
However, neither the Constitution nor general principles of public utility
law prohibit the adoption of a comprehensive, fair water-based growth
limitation policy.,
B. Constitutionality of Growth Control
1. The lessons of growth control
Any governmental effort to limit water use, and thereby curb urban
and agricultural development raises complex technical implementation
issues, federal constitutional issues and state law issues. The biggest
challenge will be to devise a water-based growth control agenda that is
both efficient and fair. It will be easier to direct water to high valued uses
than it will be to ensure that the burdens of growth limitation152 are
evenly distributed throughout society. Growth control often exacerbates
the maldistribution of economic opportunities; however, thirty years of
experience with local growth management initiatives suggests some gen-
eral standards for any governmental strategy adopted.
First, growth controls should be racially and economically neu-
tral. 5 3 Except in New Jersey,' 54 state law does not provide much protec-
149. W. STEGNER, supra note 35, at 47-49.
150. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
151. See infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
152. A basic tenet of economic theory is that price is a function of demand and supply. If
supply decreases while demand rises, prices will be forced up. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS Op LAW 6 (1986). As applied to growth limitation, if the supply of available housing is
limited while demand rises, the price of housing will rise. Only the affluent will be able to
afford housing and lower income levels will be squeezed out. Such a scenario will dispropor-
tionally burden the poor.
Under section 669.5(a) of the California Evidence Code, for example, growth limitations
are presumed to adversely affect regional housing needs. CAL. EvID. CODE § 669.5(a) (West
Supp. 1991).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(main purpose of equal protection clause is prevention of racial discrimination); Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (racial classifications are constitutionally suspect and subject to
the most rigid scrutiny); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (government not permitted
to restrict ability to engage in fundamental constitutional rights on basis of individual wealth).
154. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (1989). New Jersey courts first required that
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tion to citizens from the economic inequities of housing markets, 155 but
this indifference to growth management costs need not be repeated in this
context. State policies should go beyond the Supreme Court's limited
protection against wealth-based discrimination."5 6 Second, regional dis-
tortions should be minimized."5 7 Local growth control management
often redistributes growth in inefficient ways, and the courts have done
little to deter the distortions.1 5  Experience with growth management
suggests that basic decisions about the absolute growth levels and the
geographic distribution of growth should be made at the state level. But,
even if these guidelines are followed, there is no guarantee that states will
shield growth from the range of constitutional and quasi-constitutional
challenges that opponents may raise.
cities and counties provide realistic housing opportunities for some part of their resident poor.
South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390
(1983); South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The state then enacted legislation that combines regulation
and financial incentives to establish local fair share obligations. See N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 52:27D-301 to -334.
155. In most states, anti-exclusionary zoning doctrines are concerned with the provision of
a minimal mix of housing types rather than with the provision of affordable housing, see, e.g.,
Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 211-12, 460 A.2d 1075, 1080-81 (1983) (city zoning
ordinance limiting building of multi-family dwellings upheld as reasonable in light of situs and
projected population growth of area), or provide limited remedies against socio-economic dis-
crimination, see, eg., Suffolk Housing Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 131, 511
N.E.2d 67, 70, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987) (regional approach necessary to counter local
tendency to insulate communities from less desirable elements); Berensen v. Town of New
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975) (courts should
not impose specific multiple unit quotas, rather they should only assess reasonableness of what
locality has done). See Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary
Zoning Issues, 43 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 2, 5 (1979) for a comprehensive survey of the consti-
tutional law of growth management.
156. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1973) (in class
action suit by members of school district, court held education not fundamental right nor
parties in action a suspect class premised on economic inequality due to district lines).
157. For example, regional distinctions arise when the ordinance impedes the ability of low
and moderate income persons to immigrate to a community, but permits largely unimpeded
entry by wealthier individuals. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d
582, 608-09, 557 P.2d 473, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56-57 (1976). But see Arnel Dev. Co. v.
City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 340, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723, 729 (1981) (initiative that
would prevent construction of multi-family dwellings invalid). California has imposed statu-
tory duties upon cities to provide for a fair share of regional housing needs. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65584 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Selectively imposed growth controls do raise the
price of housing, see D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 599-600 (1990), so any policy must maintain a balance among housing
opportunities.
158. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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2. The constitutional challenges: the dormant commerce clause and
the right to travel
Any growth control scheme raises two related constitutional issues:
challengers may argue either that a growth control measure violates the
dormant commerce clause'5 9 or it violates their right to travel."6 The
argument is that any form of growth cap is a decision to prefer in-state
citizens over out-of-state citizens. Although the dormant commerce
clause and the right to travel probably do not prevent states from linking
population growth to water availability, they structure the debate which
follows.
These two doctrines form the core of a constitutional vision of a
federal union of individual states held in check by a strong national gov-
ernment. By definition, a federal system contemplates an imprecise allo-
cation of power between the constituent units and a national government.
The national interest is not in complete uniformity of regulatory policies
but in the maintenance of a union despite piecemeal parochial actions
which may threaten to erode it. The commerce clause preserves the na-
tional ideal in two ways. First, the affirmative commerce clause gives
Congress virtually unlimited power to preempt state legislation affecting
interstate commerce.16' Second, the dormant commerce clause allows
the judiciary, subject to congressional review,162 to invalidate state legis-
lation which discriminates against the free flow of goods and people
among states.' 63 The primary purpose of the dormant commerce clause
159. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. In the absence of congressional legislation, the clause is implied through the dormant
commerce clause. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (acknowledg-
ing that no federal law preempted state regulation, Court sought to determine whether state
law constitutional under commerce clause).
160. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. The right to travel is considered a
fundamental right of the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2. See
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (fundamental right under consti-
tution includes right of citizens of one state to pass through or reside in any other state); see
also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
161. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); see Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) (establishing plenary power of federal government in
context of commerce clause). More generally, Congress can preempt any state law (1) ex-
pressly, (2) if the federal and state laws are in conflict, and/or (3) if the federal law occupies
the field. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
162. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
163. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); see City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 617 (state law facially discriminated against out-of-state concerns and was, therefore, uncon-
stitutional); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (state
law discriminating "in effect" against out-of-state apple marketers was unconstitutional pro-
tectionism); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-90
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is to prevent states from eroding the benefits of the free flow of goods 164
by blatant protectionist action designed to prefer a defined class of in-
state residents over an equally well-defined class of unrepresented out-of-
state residents.
165
The Supreme Court has been most concerned with invalidating ac-
tions where the state has served as a conduit for rent-seeking, 166 and has
been less concerned with state actions which seek to respond to unique
state resource conservation problems.167 The results of the cases are gen-
erally sensible, but the basic principles that they articulate provide insuf-
ficient guidance to states faced with difficult conservation problems,
which may impose real costs on interstate commerce. Dormant com-
merce clause jurisprudence seeks to resolve all controversies through a
uniform balancing test which first decides whether: (1) the state regula-
tory purpose is legitimate; (2) the regulation is evenhanded; and (3) the
burdens on interstate commerce are incidental.1 6 If the regulation
passes these tests, it will be upheld unless the burdens on interstate com-
merce are excessive compared to the local benefits.169 Neither the pur-
pose nor the means chosen to achieve the purpose can discriminate
against the free flow of goods. 7
The problem that the dormant commerce clause jurisprudence poses
for a state's efforts to manage its water resources to adjust to new de-
mands and values is that the concepts do not provide an adequate frame-
work to analyze reasonable state programs that impose painful but
necessary costs on interstate commerce. 17 1 Not every state regulatory
action intended to benefit its citizens at the expense of citizens of other
states is unconstitutional. Moreover, any federal system creates built-in
(1938) (state highway safety law regulating truck size applied evenly to both residents and non-
residents did not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce).
164. See, ag., H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 539; see Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too
Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47, 65
(1981).
165. For an exhaustive articulation of this thesis, see Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986).
166. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
167. Compare Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding state law prohibiting
importation of baitfish which posed threat of contaminating local fisheries) with Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (invalidating state law which prohibited sale outside state of
fish caught in state for conservation purposes).
168. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
169. See id.
170. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625.
171. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 276-78 (1985) contains a lucid discussion of
the Court's use of discrimination to mean both protectionist effect and purpose.
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tensions between state and federal authority, and requires a balancing of
often competing interests.
Supreme Court doctrine is slowly moving toward the imposition of
resource-sharing allocations on states despite the fact that such states
strike a reasonable balance between shared and exclusive resource alloca-
tion. Although so far the Court has addressed only the handling of en-
ergy resources, not water, an understanding of the Court's analysis is
useful. The duty to share energy resources can be found in the equitable
apportionment doctrine governing the use of interstate rivers and the
dormant commerce clause cases. Together, these doctrines impose a lim-
ited duty on states to share their natural advantages with other states."12
States may not hoard resources allocated in national markets.'73 If the
country is to prosper, energy resources must be available in every state.
Accidents of geography cannot control the fate of the union and, there-
fore, resource embargoes have been routinely struck down.' 4
This energy resource analogy can be applied to water, but the case is
less compelling. The Constitution does not require unlimited water shar-
ing"'5 because of the special nature of this resource.'7 6 The Supreme
172. The Court joined these two doctrines for the first time in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Ore-
gon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983). The duty is rooted in the same principle that permeates the
commerce clause cases; "a state may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural re-
sources located within its borders." Id. (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627
(1978)). Thus, the duty may arise when a state's action "'reaches through the agency of natu-
ral laws into the territory of another state." Id. at 1024 n.8 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907)). Under the equitable apportionment doctrine, states have "an affirma-
tive duty.., to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the natural resources
within their borders for the benefit of other States." Id. at 1025; see also Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922). The
Evans Court noted that the same principle flows from the commerce clause. Evans, 426 U.S.
at 1025.
173. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385-86 (1978) ("States may
not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources... to their own people whenever
such hoarding and confinement impedes interstate commerce."); Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia, 262 U.S. 553, 565-66, aff'd, 262 U.S. 350 (1923) (state may not restrict sale of natural
gas to its citizens in times of shortage to the detriment of neighboring states).
174. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911) (court invalidated state law prohibiting exportation of oil
and gas beyond state lines as a violation of commerce clause). Likewise, states may not block
imports. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; accord Government Suppliers Consolidating
Serv. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (non-hazardous wastes); see Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
175. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
357 (1908) (right to receive water from river through pipes subject to territorial limits by
nature and those limits may be fixed by state in which river flows).
176. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950) (water is generally an economic,
as opposed to a political resource).
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Court has held that water is an article of interstate commerce, 177 but
water remains a different resource for two related reasons, one geograph-
ical and one political. In contrast to energy resources, water is univer-
sally distributed, and this distribution is perverse. Energy resources are
often concentrated in areas of limited demand, whereas water scarcity
can be concentrated in areas of high demand, as it is in Arizona, Califor-
nia, Nevada and parts of Texas. Politically, western growth control may
produce net national benefits. 178 Humid states would not face the contin-
ued population drain that erodes their political and economic base, and
less pressure would be placed on the public funds to subsidize water de-
velopment. The Supreme Court has placed a high burden on state action
which discriminates against interstate commerce, 17 9 but a state need not
wait for a national solution to take action that addresses a national prob-
lem. 1 0 The Supreme Court, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, s1I recognized that
the unique problems of western water allocation require a dormant com-
merce clause analysis that gives more weight to state conservation inter-
ests. 182 Ultimately, the federal interest in the prevention of state
parochialism is best served by a high standard of a state conservation
interest. The western states have not asserted a strong public interest in
water beyond setting the ground rules for private use; therefore, state
interests asserted to defend their refusals to share water have been post-
177. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
178. The distinction between national and local resource problems is noted in a recent dis-
trict court decision which applied the dormant commerce clause to invalidate legislation en-
acted by Indiana to prevent the use of the state for the disposal of solid waste generated outside
of the Hoosier state. Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv., 753 F. Supp. at 765 n.2.
The only post-City of Philadelphia quarantine case is Maine v. Taylor .... which
upheld a total ban on importation of baitfish to prevent the introduction of disease
that was not present in the state. Maine v. Taylor is not controlling in this case.
Some courts have tried to distinguish, with varying persuasiveness, the holding of
Maine v. Taylor in the context of statutory regulations on the importation of waste.
It appears to this court, however, that the Supreme Court simply treats state regula-
tions restricting the disposal of waste as negatively impacting a national problem.
Because of the commerce clause, states are not able to erect barriers to the effective
functioning of a national economy and, in effect, to isolate themselves from a nation-
wide concern.
Id (citations omitted).
179. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
180. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co., 416 U.S. at 221-22 (California Commission permitted to
halt construction of nuclear power plants until nuclear waste disposal problem solved); Note,
Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Post-Industrial "Natu-
ral"Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1330 (1989) ("The Con-
stitution should perhaps contain a positive bias toward protection of future generations in
order to preserve the longevity of the union.").
181. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
182. See id. at 956-57.
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hoc rationalizations."i 3 Courts have used the dormant commerce clause
to pick them off like slow moving ducks in a shooting gallery. More
substantial assertions of a state interest based on a comprehensive plan-
ning process,"8 4 which ultimately benefits the union as a whole, may be
viewed much more favorably by the Supreme Court because it represents
the bright rather than dark side of federalism.
The right to travel may impose more stringent duties on states to
accept growth because it imposes a high burden on the state to justify
regulations which infringe on interstate mobility.' Travel is one of the
few implied fundamental rights in the Constitution. 6 The right was
first recognized in the leading case of Edwards v. California."7 Califor-
nia attempted to stem the dust bowl migration into the state so elo-
quently captured in John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath, by making it
a crime to bring emigrants into the state.188
Besides protecting non-residents from state favoritism of local resi-
dents, the right to travel protects new residents of a state against wealth-
based discrimination in the provision of public services. 189 A compre-
hensive racially and economically neutral growth limitation policy would
183. See Tarlock & Frownfelter, State Groundwater Sovereignty After Sporhase: The Case of
the Hueco Bolson, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 27 (1990) (discussing New Mexico's successful efforts to
block El Paso, Texas from appropriating New Mexico groundwater for export to Texas).
184. See Odland, Growth Management: What California Can Learn from the Sunshine
State, 24 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1109 (1991) (discussing Florida's comprehensive planning
processes).
185. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1978) (discrimination against nonresidents
must bear a substantial relationship to the "evil" they are said to represent).
186. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
187. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
188. Id. at 174. Edwards can be explained as an application of either the dormant com-
merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-
67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). Originally, the Court read the privileges and immunities
clause to recognize the natural rights of each United States citizen to reside in any state. The
modem privileges and immunities clause has been subsumed into the dormant commerce
clause, and now both doctrines protect out-of-state citizens from unjustified discrimination.
See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395, 403 (1948). Fundamental rights language can still
be found in modem Supreme Court opinions. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388 (state can charge
higher elk hunting license fees to out-of-state residents because elk hunting not fundamental
right of national citizenship). The Court's reasoning is criticized in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 534-39 (1987), but Professor Tribe suggests that the rationale of the
privileges and immunities clause, to promote a more complete union, still allows states some
discretion to decide which resouces will be shared with the entire nation and which will not.
Id. at 536. See generally Simson, Discrimination Against Non-Residents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1979).
189. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974); see also Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1974); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
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not, however, penalize the exercise of the right to travel by the politically
vulnerable classes to which the Court has afforded special protection.
The Supreme Court's limited equation of the right to travel with
wealth-based discrimination cannot be the full scope of the right to
travel. Fundamental rights protect all citizens from acts that threaten to
infringe on those rights and, thus, the state has a high burden to justify
stringent migration controls. The broader lesson is that the Constitution
prohibits states from shifting the costs of dealing with a national problem
from one state to another.190 The Constitution does not, however, pre-
vent states from protecting the overuse of limited state resources. 191
C. Growth Control Through Service and Price
The major non-constitutional barrier to limiting growth to conserve
water is the basic public utility law principle that all persons who can pay
for the service are entitled to it.192 Western water managers have been
guided by this principle. For a long time, it was widely assumed that
attempts to subordinate land use policies to utility service duties were
illegal because they departed from the cost of service principle of utility
service. Arizona codified this duty in 1980 when it required that all de-
velopers must demonstrate a 100-year water supply.19 3 El Paso County,
Colorado went even further and made a 300-year water supply a precon-
dition to subdivision plat approval.1 94 The requirement of an adequate
future water supply was found to be reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest. The El Paso regulation was upheld against a tak-
ings challenge1 95 because the plaintiffs failed to prove that "the regula-
tion will prevent even residential development on their property, let
190. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627-29 (state cannot reserve limited landfill
capacity for in-state wastes because solid waste landfill capacity is a national problem);
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 176 (relief of needy is common responsibility of whole nation).
191. See CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,
332-33, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 333-34 (1974) (upholding coastal zone development regulation
intended to protect and conserve aesthetic resources of coastline); see also Northwest Cent.
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 526 (1989) (states retain power to allo-
cate and conserve natural resources).
192. See, e.g., Interwest Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 380, 510 P.2d 919
(1973).
193. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-576 (1990).
194. See Cherokee Water & Sanitation Dist. v. El Paso County, 770 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Colo.
App. 1988) for a discussion of the county regulation amendments. See supra note.
195. See U.S. Const. Amend. V; Stone & Seymour, Regulating the Timing of Development:
Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24




alone any other reasonable use."' 196
These fantastic efforts to guarantee water for future generations
should be modified. They are the latest manifestation of the West's equa-
tion of water conservation with water supply augmentation. They can
distort water allocation needs by creating a race among water suppliers
to acquire reserves at the expense of social and environmental uses, and
such supplies may blunt efforts to find alternative ways of meeting urban
demands. 197 The cost of service principle is a powerful constraint on the
use of utility service for regulatory means, but an alternative model of
public utility service is developing which recognizes the connection be-
tween utility service and land use objectives. Generalizations about pub-
lic utility law are not useful because of the great variety in state
legislation; however, in recent years, courts have been willing to sanction
the use of utility service to regulate the timing and location of growth.
198
Public and private water suppliers have supported growth through
the price they charge for water service and by the use of the public utility
principle of non-discriminatory service to those who can pay. 199 The
public utility tradition of water service has led to low uniform water rates
available to all users within the "franchise area where such duty can be
reasonably performed. ' '2"" Public utility rates are generally based on the
cost of service, and this standard often prohibits the accumulation of
funds for future increases in service or the achievement of regulatory
objectives.
Water rates reflect the average, rather than marginal cost, and most
suppliers consider themselves under a duty to find adequate supplies to
196. Cherokee Water & Sanitation Dist, 770 P.2d at 1341.
197. In Arizona, the 100-year water supply requirement has triggered intense competition
among water suppliers in the Phoenix metropolitan area. Some cities have acquired "water
farms" in rural areas along the Colorado River and the specter of dewatered rural Owens
Valleys has become a major unresolved political issue in the state. See McEntire, Water Farms
and Transfer Conflicts in Arizona, USA: A Proposed Resolution Process, 13 ENVTL. MGMT.
287 (1989).
198. Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258
(1983). See Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of Dis-
crimination, 24 GA. L. RPv. 525 (1990) for a similar argument that cities need more discretion
to review subdivision plats.
199. The major exception has been the sanction of a two-tier rate structure for in-city and
extra-territorial service. See Bleick v. City of Pappillion, 219 Neb. 575, 365 N.W.2d 405
(1985).
200. Crowell v. Hackensack Water Co., 73 PUB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 3d 466 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs). Extra-territorial service is often legislatively permitted and sanctioned
by the courts as expressive of the legislature's aim that cities remain dynamic, growing entities.
Quality Water Supply v. City of Wilmington, 97 N.C. App. 400, 406, 388 S.E.2d 608, 612
(1990).
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meet anticipated demands. The nub of any effort to adjust water use to
demand is that water is too cheap. Resource economists generally agree
that marginal rather than average cost is the correct price for a scarce
resource because it brings the true cost of production home to the con-
sumer and thus encourages conservation. °1 Public utilities began to
adopt marginal cost rates in the 1970s, and the Supreme Court has ap-
proved marginal cost pricing for power provided by the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) qualified facilities.20 2
The assumption that the duty to serve requires the acquisition of
supplies stretching into the unforeseeable future must be modified to re-
flect development opportunities to be allocated by water providers. De-
velopment opportunities can be allocated by price and the subordination
of water service to land use goals,20 3 but the West has yet to exploit this
opportunity to any meaningful extent.
The starting point for the development of a new water service policy
is the recognition that the duty to serve has never been absolute. Courts
have long recognized municipal discretion to refuse to extend water serv-
ices, 204 and courts have allowed cities to adjust growth rates to supply
201. For a review of the literature of water pricing and a proposed capacity sharing system
that creates individual user property rights in urban water supply sources, see Dudley, Urban
Capacity Sharing-An Innovative Property Right for Maturing Water Economies, 30 NAT. RE-
SOURCES 3. 381 (1990).
202. American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv., 461 U.S. 402, 423 (1983).
PURPA was designed to reduce the demand for fossil fuels. Id. at 405. Although most water
rates are uniform within a class, courts have approved variable rates. See, eg., Stepping Stones
Assocs. v. City of White Plains, aff'd 100 A.D. 2d 619,473 N.Y.S. 2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div.) 64
N.Y.2d 690, 474 N.E. 2d 1196, 485 N.Y.S. 2d 527 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066
(1985) (graduated fee scale rates which varied with usage found constitutional); Water Works
Bd. v. Barnes, 448 So. 2d 296 (Ala. 1983) (upholding three-zone rate schedule).
203. Water demand is price-sensitive, but it is not fully elastic. EI-Ashry & Gibbons, Man-
aging the West's Water, 42 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION, 8, 10-11 (1987). A study of 12
areas in California found that 1984 water use varied from approximately 300 gallons per per-
son per day in the two regions where water costs were less than $0.20 per 100 cubic feet of
water down to about 175 gallons per person per day in three regions where water costs ex-
ceeded $0.70 per 100 cubic feet. Overall correlation between water use and marginal price was
-0.62. 12 WATER STRATEGIST 12 (Jan. 1989). The most impressive study showed that in
Arizona, water use per person per day is approximately twice as great in Phoenix as in Tucson,
where water rates are approximately twice as high. F. WELCH, How To CREATE A WATER
CISIS 59 (1985).
204. The leading case is Moore v. City Council of Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. 926 (Ky. 1907).
Moore is discussed with approval in Note, Control of the Timing and Location of Government
Utility Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REv. 945, 952 (1974); see also Biggs, No Drip, No Flush, No
Growth. How Cities Can Control Growth Beyond Their Boundaries by Refusing To Extend Util-
ity Services, 22 URB. L. 285 (1990); Kelly, Piping Growth: The Law, Economics, and Equity of
Sewer and Water Connection Policies, LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG., July 1984, at 3. But
cf Cantrell v. Henry County, 250 Ga. 822, 301 S.E.2d 870 (1983) (estoppel against county
because it accepted water service deposits).
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availability through moratoria. Cities may limit new taps to adjust
growth to available supplies20 5 and they need not participate in specula-
tive development schemes.20 6 More generally, the governmental model
posits that a water supplier has the discretion to deny service for cost,
20 7
water conservation208 and growth control2°9 as long as a sufficient quan-
tity and quality of water is unavailable.210
Service moratoria are, of course, premised on the assumption that
the capacity defect will be cured within a reasonable period of time.
However, recent water service and development exaction cases reveal a
broader skepticism of the merits of unlimited growth. The public utility
theory of strict service duties211 is being replaced by one which allows
cities to subordinate utility service to growth management objectives. In
contrast to older cases, recent cases have acccepted the argument that
utility extensions must be subordinated to land use policies if cities are to
be permitted to implement rational growth management policies.212
"Neither common law nor constitutional law inhibits the broad grant of
power to local government officials to refuse to extend utility service so
205. Gilbert v. State, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1990); Colorado Inv. Serv.
v. City of Westminister, 636 P.2d 1316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
206. Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 31 N.J. Super. 459, 107 A.2d 20
(1954).
207. Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
See 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 763 (1969); Note, The Duty
of a Public Utility To Render Adequate Service, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312 (1965).
208. Swanson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 128 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 (1978). ("[A] water
district is empowered to anticipate a future water shortage and to impose appropriate regula-
tions and restrictions where, lacking such control, its water supply will become depleted and it
will be unable to meet the needs of its consumers."); accord P-W Inv. v. City of Westminster,
655 P.2d 1365 (Colo. 1982); see Note, Public Utility Land Use Control on the Urban Fringe, 63
IOWA L. REv. 889 (1978).
209. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d
271, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1967); Boulder Builders Group v. City of Boulder, 759 P.2d 752 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); cf City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp.,
371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (fixed population
cap).
210. Compare New Jersey Shore Builders Ass'n v. Mayor and Township Comm., 234 N.J.
Super. 619, 561 A.2d 319 (1989) (moratorium invalid because raw water available and town-
ship failed to demonstrate health hazard to justify action) with McMillian v. Goleta Water
Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987) (moratorium valid in
water-short Santa Barbara County) and Gilbert v. State, 218 Cal. App. 3d 234, 266 Cal. Rptr.
891 (1990) (moratorium valid where conditioned on lack of satisfactory water source supply).
211. The leading case of Robinson v. City of Boulder, 190 Colo. 357, 547 P.2d 228 (1976),
established this principle, but was later overruled in Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver Bd.
of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d 235 (1986).
212. The leading recent case is Dateline Builders, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258.
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long as they do not act for personal gain or in a wholly arbitrary or
discriminatory manner." '213 This position is a logical outgrowth of the
Court's acceptance of growth management as a rationale for shifting
more of the costs of financing the future services to new residents.2 14
This position has its limits because any effort to tie water service to
growth management policies raises serious equity concerns. Water scar-
city is a general problem that all citizens helped to create so the burdens
of adjustment should not be shifted entirely to developers. The most im-
portant constraints on state and local policies are not likely to be on the
power to subordinate growth to water availibility, but in the way in
which the costs of new utility service is distributed.
Courts have not prevented cities from using impact fees to shift a
higher percentage of infrastructure costs onto new residents.215 How-
ever, the principle of non-discriminatory service between new and estab-
lished residents makes courts sensitive to excessive differentials among
classes of utility customers.216 Cities may use differential charges to ac-
cumulate funds for future service,2 17 but at some point cities must equal-
ize the burden of utility service among existing and new residents.
VII. CONCLUSION
Global warming may be the most serious environmental threat fac-
ing the West. If, as many believe, global warming is occurring, there is
increased urgency to begin the necessary modification of our historic
water allocation policies to accommodate all those attracted to the West.
Federal and western state water managers are presented with a unique
opportunity to begin designing a set of water allocation institutions that
will allow the modern West to continue as a viable region even as aridity
213. Id. at 530, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
214. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
215. See, eg., South Shell Inv. v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 703 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D.N.C.
1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990); Associated Home Builders, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630; Dunedin, 312 So. 2d 763.
216. Courts have invalidated sewer and water connection fees which shift too high a per-
centage of the costs of new facilities to new residents to do rough equality between existing and
new residents.
217. Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 105 Wash. 2d 288, 714 P.2d 1163 (1986);
City of Arvada v. City and County of Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 663 P.2d 611 (Colo.
1983) (city may accumulate fund for future development). But see Southern Nev.
Homebuilders Ass'n v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 693 P.2d 1255 (Nev. 1985); Lafferty v.
Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982) (connection fees may be levied to recover costs identifi-
able with the properties charged).
1012 Vol. 24:979
June 1991] WESTERN WATER LAW 1013
becomes an operational fact of daily life. Water marketing will become
the cornerstone of an adaptive strategy because water can be shifted to
areas of highest demand. As is almost always the case, the impediments
to an effective western response to the consequences of global climate
change are political, not constitutional or legal. Neither the Constitution
nor general principles of public utility law prohibit the adoption of a
comprehensive, fair water-based growth limitation policy. Utility service
may be subordinated to growth management objectives as part of a com-
prehensive planning process.
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